"'We Have Nothing to Do With It': How Statements of Denial by Armed Actors Shape Public Perceptions and Emotions," with Ilayda Onder (revise and resubmit at Political Psychology)
Abstract: Armed groups operating in conflicts across the world publish statements of denial to dissociate themselves from acts of violence. Existing research argues that armed groups may publish denial statements to avoid public backlash, favorably frame the conduct of their campaigns, and distance themselves from unsanctioned actions executed by rank-and-file members. However, the broader psychological impact of denial statements on public perceptions remains largely unexplored. Investigating the effects of denial statements published by armed groups, we conducted a novel survey experiment with a national sample of 1,616 U.S. adults. Participants were presented with a fictional attack attributed to an armed group by the government and randomly assigned to conditions in which the group denied, claimed, or remained silent about the attack. Our findings reveal that denials reduce perceived culpability in attacks, undermine trust in government, and alter emotional responses to violence. These results highlight how denial statements may serve as important rhetorical tools in armed groups’ discursive repertoire. This study contributes to scholarship on experimental research in conflict studies, armed groups’ communication strategies, and the effects of militant discourse on public perceptions.
"Commanders of the Mujahideen: Introducing the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD)," with Maria Amjad, Sara Daub, Ilayda Onder, and Joshua Weiner (revise and resubmit and Journal of Peace Research)
Abstract: Recent research has explored how militant leaders’ backgrounds shape their decision-making. However, existing studies primarily focus on leaders of rebel groups participating in civil wars, overlooking smaller, yet lethal and influential, armed groups that operate outside civil war contexts. To address this gap, we introduce the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD), which provides original, systematic data on the backgrounds and pre-war experiences of 238 leaders from 110 jihadist organizations. The dataset covers organizations operating across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East between 1976 and 2023, capturing a broad range of actors that are central to contemporary conflicts. Drawing on Arabic, English, French, German, Turkish, and Urdu sources, we document biographical information on 31 leader-level variables, offering the potential for analyzing how jihadist leaders’ prior experiences shape their preferences and the behavior of the groups they command. In addition to detailing our data collection procedures and presenting descriptive statistics, we illustrate the JLD’s utility through a quantitative analysis of the leader-level determinants of suicide bombings. The JLD advances research on militant leaders, jihadist actors, and the role of individual decision-makers in shaping conflict processes.
"Beyond Outbidding: How Transnational Jihadists Reshape Competitive Violent Markets," with Ilayda Onder (under review)
Abstract: Numerous jihadist organizations competing with local armed groups for resources in conflicts around the world have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS). How do transnational jihadist rivals (AQ/IS affiliates) shape the behavior of local groups? Scholars argue that increased competition in violent political markets encourages armed groups to escalate violence against civilians to distinguish their ``brand.'' However, existing research has largely overlooked how the type of actor involved in conflicts, rather than the quantity of groups, shapes competitive dynamics. We argue that transnational jihadists, with their legacy of brutality and high levels of international scrutiny, reshape militant competition, making escalatory violence ineffective and counterproductive for local groups seeking brand differentiation. Instead, we propose a theory of restrained competition, where local groups moderate civilian harm to distinguish themselves, thereby bolstering their local support and international appeal. We posit that this reputational calculus intensifies when groups maintain a greater ideological distance from transnational jihadists and have credible prospects to improve their international standing through restrained behavior. Using original data on pledges to AQ and IS, and leveraging their sudden emergence as a quasi-experimental treatment, we apply a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis. Aligning with our restrained competition theory, we find that armed groups--particularly those with non-religious ideologies and that are not designated as terrorist organizations by the United States--reduce violence against civilians in response to transnational jihadist competitors. Our findings challenge assumptions about escalation in fragmented conflicts, offering new insights into armed group behavior.
"A Call to Arms: How Rebel Groups Choose Their Recruitment Tactics," with Michael Soules (under review)
Abstract: Why do some rebel groups mobilize around diverse grievances, while others organize around a narrow set of issues? Employing diverse recruitment appeals is a risky strategy. On one hand, rebel groups can widen their recruitment pool by appealing to broader segments of society. On the other hand, groups that represent multiple interests are often plagued by in-fighting and low cohesion, as members disagree about which issues to prioritize. Building on existing research, we contend that radical Islamist groups are more likely to recruit with a more diverse range of claims than other rebel organizations. This is because radical Islamist movements have the incentive and capacity to unite diverse interests through shared identity; they can use diverse grievances to promote the idea that Islam is threatened; and their frequent internationalization places them in conflict with local, regional, and international actors, widening the scope of their grievances. To analyze this argument, we leverage novel data on the recruitment practices of 232 rebel movements across the world. We find support for the hypothesis that radical Islamist organizations employ more diverse ideological recruitment appeals than other rebel groups. This paper contributes to studies on rebel recruitment tactics, jihadist actors, and ideology in civil war.
Abstract: Armed groups operating in conflicts across the world publish statements of denial to dissociate themselves from acts of violence. Existing research argues that armed groups may publish denial statements to avoid public backlash, favorably frame the conduct of their campaigns, and distance themselves from unsanctioned actions executed by rank-and-file members. However, the broader psychological impact of denial statements on public perceptions remains largely unexplored. Investigating the effects of denial statements published by armed groups, we conducted a novel survey experiment with a national sample of 1,616 U.S. adults. Participants were presented with a fictional attack attributed to an armed group by the government and randomly assigned to conditions in which the group denied, claimed, or remained silent about the attack. Our findings reveal that denials reduce perceived culpability in attacks, undermine trust in government, and alter emotional responses to violence. These results highlight how denial statements may serve as important rhetorical tools in armed groups’ discursive repertoire. This study contributes to scholarship on experimental research in conflict studies, armed groups’ communication strategies, and the effects of militant discourse on public perceptions.
"Commanders of the Mujahideen: Introducing the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD)," with Maria Amjad, Sara Daub, Ilayda Onder, and Joshua Weiner (revise and resubmit and Journal of Peace Research)
Abstract: Recent research has explored how militant leaders’ backgrounds shape their decision-making. However, existing studies primarily focus on leaders of rebel groups participating in civil wars, overlooking smaller, yet lethal and influential, armed groups that operate outside civil war contexts. To address this gap, we introduce the Jihadist Leaders Dataset (JLD), which provides original, systematic data on the backgrounds and pre-war experiences of 238 leaders from 110 jihadist organizations. The dataset covers organizations operating across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East between 1976 and 2023, capturing a broad range of actors that are central to contemporary conflicts. Drawing on Arabic, English, French, German, Turkish, and Urdu sources, we document biographical information on 31 leader-level variables, offering the potential for analyzing how jihadist leaders’ prior experiences shape their preferences and the behavior of the groups they command. In addition to detailing our data collection procedures and presenting descriptive statistics, we illustrate the JLD’s utility through a quantitative analysis of the leader-level determinants of suicide bombings. The JLD advances research on militant leaders, jihadist actors, and the role of individual decision-makers in shaping conflict processes.
"Beyond Outbidding: How Transnational Jihadists Reshape Competitive Violent Markets," with Ilayda Onder (under review)
Abstract: Numerous jihadist organizations competing with local armed groups for resources in conflicts around the world have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) or the Islamic State (IS). How do transnational jihadist rivals (AQ/IS affiliates) shape the behavior of local groups? Scholars argue that increased competition in violent political markets encourages armed groups to escalate violence against civilians to distinguish their ``brand.'' However, existing research has largely overlooked how the type of actor involved in conflicts, rather than the quantity of groups, shapes competitive dynamics. We argue that transnational jihadists, with their legacy of brutality and high levels of international scrutiny, reshape militant competition, making escalatory violence ineffective and counterproductive for local groups seeking brand differentiation. Instead, we propose a theory of restrained competition, where local groups moderate civilian harm to distinguish themselves, thereby bolstering their local support and international appeal. We posit that this reputational calculus intensifies when groups maintain a greater ideological distance from transnational jihadists and have credible prospects to improve their international standing through restrained behavior. Using original data on pledges to AQ and IS, and leveraging their sudden emergence as a quasi-experimental treatment, we apply a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis. Aligning with our restrained competition theory, we find that armed groups--particularly those with non-religious ideologies and that are not designated as terrorist organizations by the United States--reduce violence against civilians in response to transnational jihadist competitors. Our findings challenge assumptions about escalation in fragmented conflicts, offering new insights into armed group behavior.
"A Call to Arms: How Rebel Groups Choose Their Recruitment Tactics," with Michael Soules (under review)
Abstract: Why do some rebel groups mobilize around diverse grievances, while others organize around a narrow set of issues? Employing diverse recruitment appeals is a risky strategy. On one hand, rebel groups can widen their recruitment pool by appealing to broader segments of society. On the other hand, groups that represent multiple interests are often plagued by in-fighting and low cohesion, as members disagree about which issues to prioritize. Building on existing research, we contend that radical Islamist groups are more likely to recruit with a more diverse range of claims than other rebel organizations. This is because radical Islamist movements have the incentive and capacity to unite diverse interests through shared identity; they can use diverse grievances to promote the idea that Islam is threatened; and their frequent internationalization places them in conflict with local, regional, and international actors, widening the scope of their grievances. To analyze this argument, we leverage novel data on the recruitment practices of 232 rebel movements across the world. We find support for the hypothesis that radical Islamist organizations employ more diverse ideological recruitment appeals than other rebel groups. This paper contributes to studies on rebel recruitment tactics, jihadist actors, and ideology in civil war.